158. Embodied meaning, inside and out: The coupling of gesture and mental simulation

1. Inside and out: Mental simulation and gesture
2. Speaker simulation shapes speaker gesture
3. Speaker gesture shapes speaker simulation
4. Speaker gesture shapes listener simulation
5. Listener simulation shapes perception of speaker gesture
6. Conclusion: Simulation, gesture, and the embodiment of meaning
7. References

Abstract

During situated interaction, meaning construction is embodied inside and out. Meaning is embodied internally when we create embodied simulations, co-opting brain areas specialized for perception or action to create dynamic mental representations, rich in sensorimotor detail. Thinking of petting a kitten, for instance, might include visual simulation of its appearance and motor simulation of the act of petting — all in brain areas typically used to see and touch kittens. At the same time, meaning is embodied externally in representational gestures, actions of the hands and body that represent objects, actions, and ideas. In this chapter, we argue that these internal and external embodiments are tightly coupled, with bidirectional causal influences between gesture and simulation, both within the speaker and between speaker and listener. By embodying meaning, inside and out, language users take advantage of the complementary semiotic affordances of thought and action, brain and body.

1. Inside and out: Mental simulation and gesture

The creation of meaning is intimately tied to the body. Or rather, bodies. Meaning-making is seldom solitary, and the prototypical linguistic encounter involves multiple interacting agents working together to negotiate shared meaning. These multiple interlocutors use their bodies as fully fleshed out semiotic resources during situated talk (Goodwin 2000; Kendon 2004; McNeill 2005). That is, they gesture, moving their hands and bodies in meaningful ways. Meaning is also embodied less visibly. The neural activity supporting language comprehension and production relies on brain areas that are re-purposed from perception and action — that is, “embodied” brain areas — and these areas coordinate during comprehension to create “embodied simulations” of linguistic content (Barsalou 2008; Glenberg 2010). In this chapter, we argue that simulation and gesture are forms of embodiment that are tightly and multiply coupled during situated meaning-making.

To start, the body makes an invisible contribution to meaning in virtue of interlocutors’ embodied simulations (Barsalou 2008). When comprehenders hear language describing bodily actions, their brains’ motor systems become engaged in a content-specific way. That is, hearing a sentence about kicking engages motor circuitry responsible for controlling leg actions, just as hearing a sentence about chewing lights up neural areas for actual mouth-moving (Pulvermüller and Fadiga 2010). This content-specific use of
Embodied meaning, inside and out

Brain circuits specialized for action are paralleled in perception: processing language about visible objects and events activates visual regions of the brain (Stanfield and Zwaan 2001), while language about audible things prompts a detailed auditory simulation of their sound (Winter and Bergen 2012). There is now convergent evidence for embodied simulation during language comprehension from brain imaging, behavioral experimentation, and neuropsychological lesion studies (Bergen 2012). This internal simulation of what it might be like to perform described actions or perceive described objects and events has been most thoroughly studied during language comprehension, but there's initial evidence that it plays a role in language production as well. One leading idea (Sato 2010) is that speakers perform embodied simulations at the phase of message generation (cf. Levelt 1993) during language production. If a message includes percepts or actions, embodied simulation might play a role in its construction.

A second, more visible way in which the body is recruited to create meaning is through the production of gestures, spontaneous movements — typically of the hands — that take advantage of the motor-visual channel to complement speech. Representational gestures, in particular, use a combination of hand morphology, motion trajectory, and spatial location to represent concrete or abstract referents through literal or metaphorical resemblance. While speech and gesture are tightly coupled in both timing and meaning, they often express information that is complementary rather than identical (McNeill 2005). You might ask, “Have you grown?” while using an extended index finger to trace an upward trajectory — communicating that the question is about height, not heft. Or you could say, “My mood has really changed,” while pointing upward, using space metaphorically to communicate that your mood has changed for the better.

Fig. 158.1: Relations between gesture and simulation: speaker simulation drives speaker gesture (a); speaker gesture influences speaker simulation (b) and listener simulation (c); and listener simulation shapes their interpretation of speaker gesture (d).

158. Embodied meaning, inside and out 2001
Situated meaning-making is embodied inside and out: in the internal embodied simulations that accompany message formulation and comprehension, and in the external meaningful gestures that accompany speech. Crucially, these embodied processes work in concert (Fig. 158.1): a speaker’s mental simulation drives her gestures (§3); her gestures influence her own (§4) and listeners’ simulations (§5); and a listener’s ongoing simulation may even shape her interpretation of speakers’ gestures (§6).

2. Speaker simulation shapes speaker gesture

Embodied simulation and gesture are both particularly well suited to representing action. Motor simulation re-engages neural circuitry that is also responsible for action performance; gesture, as meaningful manual action, can (re-)enact actions with high fidelity. Pursuing this similarity, Hostetter and Alibali (2008) argued that external gestures are actually the product of internal action simulation (see Fig. 158.1a). On their account, whenever motor or visual simulation of action exceeds a threshold of activation, the simulated action is expressed as real, gestural action. A number of other authors have suggested that gestures are the product of imagistic or motor representations generated during language production (e.g. Kita and Özyürek 2003; McNeill 2005), although none of these have explicitly connected those imagistic processes to embodied neural simulation. This threshold may be sensitive to a number of factors, including neural connectivity, cognitive load, and socio-communicative norms. They suggest further that speech-related activation of the motor system makes simulated action most likely to “spill out” as gesture during language production, although gestures are sometimes produced in the absence of speech (e.g. Chu and Kita 2011).

In line with this proposal, several recent studies have found that increased action simulation predicts increased representational gestures. In Hostetter and Alibali (2010), for instance, participants either created or viewed geometric patterns, and then described them from memory. Participants produced more representational gestures when describing patterns that they had created themselves rather than merely viewed. Similarly, Sassenberg and Van Der Meer (2010) reported that, during route descriptions, representational gestures were more common during increased mental simulation, independent of task difficulty.

Gesture also reflects specific details of ongoing simulation. When people describe how they solved the Tower of Hanoi puzzle, which involves rearranging different sized disks, the trajectories of their gestures reflect the trajectories of the manual actions they actually used to solve the puzzle (Wagner Cook and Tanenhaus 2009), suggesting that gesture form is shaped by the particulars of motor simulation. Embodied simulation, moreover, can vary in focus, perspective, length, and degree of detail, and grammatical choices during language production may reflect these features of simulation. For example, producing progressive language may reflect increased focus in simulation on the ongoing process of the described state or event, as contrasted, say, with the resulting endstate (Bergen and Wheeler 2010; Madden and Zwaan 2003). And indeed when speakers produce progressive rather than perfect sentences, their accompanying gestures are longer-lasting and more complex (Parrill, Bergen, and Lichtenstein 2013). Similarly, during event descriptions, the viewpoint adopted in gesture — either internal or external to the event — is shaped by the body’s involvement in the described event (Parrill 2010) and by the kind of motion information encoded in speech (Parrill 2011), both of which
may reflect aspects of simulated viewpoint (Brunyé et al. 2009). To the extent that aspect and other grammatical features accurately diagnose properties of embodied simulation, it appears that speakers express the product of simulation in not only the linguistic channel, but also the gestural channel.

3. Speaker gesture shapes speaker simulation

A speaker’s gestures can also prompt and shape their own embodied simulation (Fig. 158.1b). Representational gestures have been proposed to help maintain mental imagery during language production (de Ruiter 2000), or to “help speakers organize rich spatio-motoric information into packages suitable for speaking” (Kita 2000: 163). More generally, producing representational gestures may encourage an embodied simulation of the objects and events represented in gesture. For instance, Alibali and colleagues (2011) had participants solve variants of the following gear-rotation puzzle: If there are five gears in a row, each interlocked with its neighbors, and the first gear turns counterclockwise, then in what direction will the last gear turn? This puzzle can be solved using either a “sensorimotor” strategy that relies on a mentally simulating the gears’ rotation or a more formal “parity” strategy that takes advantage of the alternating pattern of gear rotation (i.e. odd gears will turn counterclockwise, even gears clockwise). Gesturing made participants more likely to adopt the sensorimotor strategy, compared to trials where they spontaneously chose not to gesture and to trials where gesture was inhibited. Gesturing also improves performance on classic mental rotation tasks (Chu and Kita 2011), but only if the gesture is actually produced and not merely seen (Goldin-Meadow et al. 2012). Producing gestures, therefore, may encourage embodied simulation during problem solving.

Gesture production can also evoke detailed sensorimotor information. In one study, Beilock and Goldin-Meadow (2010) had participants solve the Tower of Hanoi puzzle (pre-test) and then solve it again after a brief pause (post-test). For half the participants, the relative weights of the disks were surreptitiously switched before the post-test, which impaired performance — but only if, between pre-test and post-test, participants explained how they had solved the puzzle in the pre-test. The fact that participants were unaffected by the switched weights if they hadn’t explained their solution — and thus hadn’t gestured about the task — suggests that gesture itself was responsible for shaping speakers’ embodied representation of the task. Indeed, the impact of switching weights was mediated by the kinds of gestures produced during the explanation: the more the gestures represented the relative weights of the disks, the more post-test performance was affected by the switched weights. In other words, gesturing about the disks’ task-irrelevant weights added precise weight information to participants’ representations of the puzzle. These multimodal influences of gesture on thought suggest that gestures are not merely visible (Hofstetter and Alibali 2008) but also a distinctly felt form of embodiment, shaping the precise sensorimotor information included in accompanying simulation (cf. Goldin-Meadow et al. 2012).

4. Speaker gesture shapes listener simulation

One of the classic findings in the study of co-speech gesture is that speakers’ gestures contribute to listeners’ comprehension, affecting representations in long-term memory
One mechanism for this influence may be the modulation of listeners’ motor or visual simulation (Fig. 158.1c), and several recent studies support this proposal. Viewing gestures that represent actions may prompt a listener to simulate the performance of that action. Gestures that encode fine details of the trajectory of a manual action can lead the listener to include those details in their subsequent reproduction of the action, as if viewing the gesture prompted a detailed motor simulation of the action (Cook and Tanenhaus 2009). Moreover, a speaker’s gestures may guide the listener’s creation of a detailed visual simulation. In one experiment, Wu and Coulson (2007) showed participants videos of a man describing everyday objects, followed by a picture of the mentioned object. Crucially, the shape of the pictured object could be compatible with both the man’s speech and gesture, or with his speech alone. For example, when the man said, “It’s actually a double door,” this could refer to Dutch-style double doors in which two half-doors are stacked one on top of the other, or French-style double doors where two full doors are placed side by side. When his speech was accompanied by a bimanual gesture that evoked Dutch-style double doors — his hands stacked on top of each other — then a subsequent picture of Dutch-style double doors would be related to both his speech and his gesture, while a picture of French-style double doors would be related to his speech but not his gesture. They found that pictures were easier to process when they matched both speech and gesture, as if the fine details of the man’s gesture shaped the listener’s visual simulation of the speech content. Gestures produced by a speaker during discourse, therefore, can rapidly shape the fine details of a listener’s motor and visual simulation of discourse content.

5. Listener simulation shapes perception of speaker gesture

Any particular representational gesture can, in principle, represent an infinite range of hypothetical referents. Consider a gesture tracing an upward trajectory. Does it represent the flightpath of a bumblebee? Or a disco-dancing move? The precise meaning of a gesture is often disambiguated by discursive context or concurrent speech (e.g. “It flew to the flower” vs. “He danced like Travolta.”). Another possible source of disambiguation, currently underexplored, is the comprehender’s embodied simulation at the moment they perceive a gesture. A comprehender’s concurrent or preceding simulation may shape their interpretation of a speaker’s gestures, perhaps by selectively focusing attention on specific facets of a gesture’s motor or visuospatial properties (Fig. 158.1d). Consider the different ways in which a gesture can stand in for a referent: by depicting, tracing an object’s shape in the air; by enacting, recreating some part of an action; or by modeling, using the hand to stand in for another object (Kendon 2004; cf. Müller 2009, Streeck 2008). A single gesture can be ambiguous among these. Consider a hypothetical gesture produced while saying, “I wiped the water off the table,” in which a face-down open-palm handshape sweeps across a horizontal plane. This gesture could be depicting the tabletop’s shape, height, or size; enacting the manual action of wiping; or using the hand to model the cloth itself. We hypothesize that the listener’s interpretation of such a gesture, and thus the gesture’s contribution to ongoing comprehension, may be shaped by their embodied simulation at the time of gesture perception. If the preceding linguistic context has prompted a motor simulation of the actions involved in cleaning (“My arm was so tired from wiping down the tabletop.”), then the ongoing motor simulation at the moment of gesture perception might lead the listener to interpret the
gesture as an *enactment*. In contrast, if the conversation up until then has focused on the table’s appearance (“It was a gorgeous antique table with the flattest top you’ve ever seen, but there was water on it.”), then the ongoing visual simulation of the table’s appearance could increase attention to the way the gesture represents the visuospatial properties of the table or spill (e.g. its height or shape), prompting a *depictive* interpretation. Similarly, the viewpoint of a listener’s ongoing simulation, either internal or external to an event, may influence their interpretation of gestures that are ambiguous with respect to viewpoint. The perceived meaning of a speaker’s gesture, therefore, could be shaped by properties of the interlocutor’s ongoing embodied simulation, although at present we know of no empirical support for this proposal.

6. Conclusion: Simulation, gesture, and the embodiment of meaning

Situated meaning-making involves the body in at least two ways: as gesture and as embodied simulation. As we have seen, these two sources of embodiment, external and internal, are tightly coupled both within and between interlocutors (Fig. 158.1).

This chapter has focused on concrete meanings: physical actions and objects, spatial arrays, perceivable events. But the human semantic potential far outstrips the concrete, allowing us to communicate about things unseen, displaced in time and space, and things *unseeable* like time, love, and mathematics. Even these abstract domains, however, may become meaningful through our bodies. Concepts as abstract as time and arithmetic may be mapped metaphorically to more concrete domains, and thus rely on sensorimotor simulations of those concrete source domains (Gibbs 2006; Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Gestures about abstract concepts that are understood metaphorically, moreover, often reflect the concepts’ spatial and embodied sources (Cienki and Müller 2008; Marghetis and Núñez 2013). For instance, even though numbers do not literally vary in size, talk of “bigger” or “smaller” numbers may involve both spatial simulations of size and gestures that reflect spatial metaphors for number (Núñez and Marghetis to appear).

The fact that one source of embodiment is tucked inside the skull and the other is cast out into the world has implications for the representational work that they can do. First, gestures are visible to interlocutors, both intended and unintended, and are thus distinctly *public*; simulation, on the other hand, is shielded from others by the braincase, and is thus a *private* form of embodiment. Second, simulation is multimodal and thus generates a richly embodied representation, including taste and smell (e.g. Louwerse and Connell 2012); gesture, tied to the manual modality, forces a schematization of the represented content, tied more to action than to any other modality (Goldin-Meadow et al. 2012). Third, simulation isn’t limited by the physiology of the hand (or body), and so it can represent the impossible, the difficult, the novel — but it is softly constrained by physiology and experience, so that it is more difficult to simulate unnatural or difficult actions (e.g. Flusberg and Boroditsky 2011). The body proper, by contrast, is perfectly suited for representing *itself*, without recourse to internal representations of its physiology; manual gestures afford rich representations of manual actions. In sum, gesture and simulation differ in terms of their publicity, their multimodal richness, and their representational affordances.
“It is my body which gives meaning,” wrote Merleau-Ponty, “not only to the natural object, but also to cultural objects like words” (2002: 273). This meaning-giving body, we have argued, makes its contribution in at least two ways — as internal simulation, and as external gestures — each shaping the other during situated interaction.

7. References


Tyler Marghetis, San Diego (USA)

Benjamin K. Bergen, San Diego (USA)